| Contents |
Introduction -- The Freedom of Information Act and the war against transparency -- The nature of inter-branch policy communication -- Misconceptions about inter-branch relations -- The bureaucracy: Congress's backdoor to policy influence -- Back-channel representation -- Congressional access and influence in the bureaucracy -- Conclusion. |
| Abstract |
"Backdoor Lawmaking reveals how members of the US Congress use the federal bureaucracy as a backdoor for policymaking. Lawmakers pressure agencies to make policy changes in order to avoid obstacles in the legislative process. The book uses records obtained under the Freedom of Information Act in qualitative and quantitative analyses to show how members of Congress are incorporating agency regulations into a broader strategy of policymaking that spans branches of government and which lawmakers are most effective at using this approach. Lawmakers use agency regulations as a substitute for legislative action, pressure agencies to delay and block the implementation of law until new legislation is passed, and work with agencies to draft legislation. The bureaucracy also offers lawmakers a discreet way to represent controversial interests outside of the formal constraints of Congress. The book considers the implications of its findings for democratic accountability and representation and assesses the normative tradeoffs: Inter-branch policymaking allows members of Congress to evade accountability and to bypass the lawmaking process established in the US Constitution. Yet, it may be critical for preserving democratic norms given the growth of administrative lawmaking"-- Provided by publisher. |
| Bibliography note | Includes bibliographical references and index. |
| Access restriction | Available only to authorized users. |
| Technical details | Mode of access: World Wide Web |
| Genre/form | Electronic books. |
| LCCN | 2023007297 |
| ISBN | 9780197670491 (paperback) |
| ISBN | 9780197670484 (hardback) |
| ISBN | (epub) |
