ECU Libraries Catalog

Nuclear weapons and coercive diplomacy / Todd S. Sechser, Matthew Fuhrmann.

Author/creator Sechser, Todd S. author.
Other author/creatorFuhrmann, Matthew, 1980- author.
Format Book and Print
Publication Info Cambridge, United Kingdom : Cambridge University Press, 2017.
Copyright Notice ©2017
Descriptionxiii, 333 pages ; 23 cm
Subject(s)
Contents Nuclear blackmail in international politics -- Nuclear coercion and nuclear skepticism -- Standoffs: nuclear weapons in crisis bargaining -- Stalemates: territorial disputes and nuclear politics -- Brinkmanship busts: when nuclear coercion fails -- Think again: reassessing nuclear victories -- Nuclear coercion in myth and reality.
Abstract Are nuclear weapons useful for coercive diplomacy? Since 1945, most strategic thinking about nuclear weapons has focused on deterrence - using nuclear threats to prevent attacks against the nation's territory and interests. But an often overlooked question is whether nuclear threats can also coerce adversaries to relinquish possessions or change their behavior. Can nuclear weapons be used to blackmail other countries? The prevailing wisdom is that nuclear weapons are useful for coercion, but this book shows that this view is badly misguided. Nuclear weapons are useful mainly for deterrence and self-defense, not for coercion. The authors evaluate the role of nuclear weapons in several foreign policy contexts and present a trove of new quantitative and historical evidence that nuclear weapons do not help countries achieve better results in coercive diplomacy. The evidence is clear: the benefits of possessing nuclear weapons are almost exclusively defensive, not offensive.
Bibliography noteIncludes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN9781107106949 hardcover
ISBN110710694X hardcover
ISBN9781107514515 paperback
ISBN1107514517 paperback

Available Items

Library Location Call Number Status Item Actions
Joyner General Stacks E744 .S33 2017 ✔ Available Place Hold